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**USAID
BUREAU FOR
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE**

**OFFICE OF TRANSITION
INITIATIVES:
THE FIRST TWO YEARS**



**A REPORT TO CONGRESS
MAY 1996**

Office of Transition Initiatives:
The First Two Years
A Report to Congress
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THE TRANSITION

Conflict is everywhere. At any one time in the past ten years, dozens of countries have been caught up in civil wars, violent insurrections, or self-destructive behaviors. When the fighting ends, former enemies must still live with each other.

Peace is difficult to attain- making it irreversible is an even greater challenge, requiring reliable security, basic survival assistance, political maturation, and economic progress.

Existing institutions are hard-pressed to deal with this volatile world.

Humanitarian agencies provide life-saving relief , but find the political nature of these post-conflict societies vexing. Development agencies offer long-term help but without the necessary speed. Non-governmental organizations find the highly-charged political environment unsettling. Militaries are helpful in quelling the fighting, but are eager to avoid a commitment to civilian development.

Political responses have traditionally focused on elections, new justice systems, and bilateral technical assistance. While these are necessary for sustainable development, the circumstances in post-conflict countries often feature a more immediate and less formalized set of challenges:

- * weak governments with few human or financial resources
- * little familiarity with international conventions
- * a capital city bias with the majority of the population elsewhere
- * no functioning economy
- * large numbers of former fighters without skills
- * land mines
- * predatory security forces
- * human rights abuses
- * a lack of public confidence
- * centrally controlled disinformation networks
- * endemic corruption
- * closed political systems
- * rising expectations
- * immature political leaders
- * over ambitious peace settlements

THE RESPONSE

Faced with a proliferation of crises, the United States and the international community have been searching for effective ways of moving beyond the politically charged complex emergencies which now consume 90% of our humanitarian assistance.

Today's threats and opportunities require new approaches that combine the speed and responsiveness of humanitarian operations with the resources and the long-term perspective of development models.

At his confirmation hearings before the Senate in 1993, Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood suggested a new mechanism that would bring fast, direct, and overt assistance to priority countries emerging from distress. With the support of the Congress, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was started in early 1994 to help countries move beyond conflict by addressing fundamental political development needs.

Based within USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response, and with the special two-year authorities of International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding, the Office has focused on innovative operations in Angola, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda, while reviewing other countries, such as Liberia, regularly.

The approach is practical and flexible; looking for the near-term intervention that will provide the maximum long-term catalytic impact.

In places that have been long at war, OTI may focus on land mines, because their presence impairs any freedom of movement. Where the populace has been oppressed by a tiny, ruling minority, OTI may emphasize freedom of expression through the demobilization and retraining of the military. Where there is a pent-up demand for community initiatives, but few resources with which to start, OTI may deliver the start-up assistance to galvanize local self-governance. Where genocide has destroyed the fabric of a society, OTI may provide the first threads of security, justice, and trust. Where centralized propaganda has misled a populace, OTI may support mass media and grass-roots initiatives that expand the flow of information.

In every case, OTI is striving to empower the citizenry of a country, so that they can move towards democratic self rule. The goal is to further government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

A small core staff of six to eight people has partnered with international organizations, private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, host governments and individual contractors to program \$8.4 million in FY 94, \$18 million in FY 95, and a projected \$27 million in FY 96. Close relationships have been developed with State, Defense, Justice and USIA, in order to bring integrated assistance, with minimal bureaucracy.

Through its experiences, OTI has been able to develop an opportunistic, "venture capital" model which recognizes the influence of an early investment at decisive moments and the value of a problem solving approach. Recognizing that resources are finite, OTI emphasizes initiatives that will stand alone, lead to future activities by USAID or other donors, or prepare the way for international lending institutions- all within a desired time frame of less than two years.

Much has, and is, being learned. Genuine popular participation, speed, liquidity, decentralized operations and the ability to adjust quickly are invaluable qualities. So is a strong political will, capable of expressing itself, if institutions are to take hold. In countries where everything is a priority, quick, tangible results are necessary. Questioning and working to improve the operational plans of partner organizations is often critical. And, as always, having good, engaged people in the field is indispensable.

OTI is preparing for a year where we continue to work in emerging countries; refine our technical functions through applied research; and test some of our approaches in a preventive diplomacy situation.

In the midst of multiple crises, we have found that a tool like OTI can make a difference. We look forward to working with the Congress and other committed parties in developing new approaches to a world in dramatic transition.

COUNTRY SELECTION

The selection of countries is central to OTI's success. Faced with so many challenges and with decreasing international aid, initiatives must be focused where the return will be the greatest for United States foreign policy interests. The venture capital model leads to several critical questions:

- * Is this the right place?
- * Is it the right time?
- * Is there something we can do to make a difference?
- * Do we have any reliable partners?
- * Are we willing to take the risk and will there be a minimal return?

Right Place - First, and foremost, we are looking for a situation that is of significance to the United States. That can take many forms: a regional building block, an exit strategy for huge humanitarian expenditures, a civilian complement to a military intervention, a refugee crisis, a genocidal tragedy, assistance to allies, and long-term economic interests.

The importance of an opportunity is based on consultations with the USAID Administrator and colleagues within the Agency, the National Security Council, and State, and further informed with a review that often includes the Congress, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other government and outside sources.

Right Time? - The next level of analysis is a rapid-assessment of the political opening. A desire for change from the public at large and the leadership in the country is essential. Official events, such as a peace process or accord, a ceasefire, deployment of international peacekeeping forces, an election, major constitutional reform, are useful indicators.

Intensive field interviews with the citizenry, often complemented by USIA or other polling, discussions with NGOs and others that are working in a country, then gives us a "weight of the evidence" sense of the pent-up demand for change on the part of the public at large. Seldom do we find a perfect alignment from officialdom to the body politic, but the opening we seek should present a chance to shift the balance of power to the people at large. That is often determined by OTI's interpretation of who has the greatest long-term motivation: the forces of change or those of the status quo.

Possible Initiatives? - Is there anything we can do to make a difference? The OTI answer is based on the following sequence:

1. Central Political Development Needs: what is most important, now?
2. Assumptions: are there patterns of behaviour that will inform our thinking?
3. Programmatic Response: what specific steps might we take?

Throughout this process we maintain a sense of urgency, so that we can respond with a plan in less than 60 days.

Potential Partners? - In transition countries the traditional political players are often unreliable and/or have lost the public's confidence. As much as possible, OTI works directly with the people of a country and their indigenous organizations. We often work with IOs, PVOs, and NGOs. Small-scale, targeted assistance projects produce a process of priority setting, project selection and open fiscal management, all parts of the solution to greater citizen involvement in the reconstruction.

The selection of partners is driven by a sense that the organization we are working with has a positive or neutral image in a country, a firm dedication to completing the international involvement as quickly as possible and then handing off to the locals, an ability to deal with political issues in an overt way, the skill to leverage our contributions, the ability to get going right away and a flexible, non-bureaucratic management style.

Risk and Return? - The toughest variable in many prospective OTI countries is security. Without it, citizens will not be willing to take the risks that are necessary to bring about political change. If the fear of violent death is removed, then survival must be insured through food and medicine. When looking at targetted countries, these elements are not always there, but a positive trend is essential.

If the prospects for progress are promising, OTI will invest in a country. Our investment is directly related to our sense of the return. Consequently, we will invest in some places with a steadily growing commitment and in others we maintain a research and development profile, while waiting to see if circumstances improve .

Where we have chosen to initiate programs, OTI has always sought to define minimal expectations: results that we could count on, even if the turbulence of the political environment made larger progress impossible.

The key to OTI's venture capital model is to be robust enough to be felt, fast enough to be relevant and integrated/cohesive enough to be realistic.

The country profiles that follow briefly describe OTI's engagement in Angola, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and plans for Liberia.

ANGOLA

Right Place? Conflict in Angola has prevented a country abundantly endowed with natural resources to prosper. A reliance on humanitarian relief has consumed tens of millions in U.S. assistance since 1992 and instability jeopardizes our interest in maintaining diversified oil sourcing, since Angola provides 7% of U.S. oil imports.

Its considerable natural resources make the achievement of peace and the development of an open political system of importance to the U.S., for investment and trade opportunities, for the elimination of emergency assistance, and for the positive regional progression that is taking place in the south of Africa.

The U.S. has played a significant role in Angola's peace process. Whereas our foreign policy towards Angola after its independence in 1975 and the ensuing civil war was motivated by Cold War interests, since the early 1990s the U.S. halted its military assistance and joined other nations in working toward peace.

Right Time? U.S. peace negotiators working on the Lusaka accords approached OTI in the early stages of the talks in 1994 to obtain strategic inputs to advance the peace process. OTI's involvement began in the summer of 1994 with technical assistance to the U.N. Humanitarian Office in Angola (UCAH) regarding quartering areas for demobilized fighters. While we moved cautiously because of the historic turbulence of the Angolan peace process, OTI saw the need to prepare the way for significant, yet modest, progress.

Key Features of Program. The central political development needs of Angola are *to build an enduring peace, to establish some freedom of movement, and to expand local self-governance and the free flow of information.* OTI has addressed these issues by helping to: design the quartering areas for former fighters; build the Angolan's capacity for dealing with land mines; deliver objective information to the populace; create tangible community driven initiatives.

In Angola OTI has taken a lead role among U.S. agencies by founding and coordinating an interagency working group. It has played a catalytic role with other agencies in the following OTI-funded programs:

- Community Revitalization Projects to support the return of displaced persons, ex-combatants, and refugees, with a focus on social infrastructure improvement and agricultural production. (Started in April 1996 with FY 96 spending of \$1.15 million and plans to extend in FY 97.)
- Land mine awareness, surveys and removal projects. The proliferation of land mines has made spontaneous resettlement of war-displaced people impossible. Therefore an important part of OTI's program to date, together with DOD, has dealt with demining. (1995-1997, with FY 95 allocation of \$5.3 million and FY 96 of \$2-4 million)
- Technical assistance to the UCAH and the UN's Central Mine Action Office. (1994-1996, with FY 94 and FY 95 totalling \$1.5 million and FY 96 obligations of \$300,000)
- Funding to Voice of America's Portuguese-to-Africa Service to strengthen coverage of events in both government and UNITA areas, and to develop conflict resolution and reconciliation programs for placement on VOA direct broadcasts and Angolan radio stations. (Broadcasts began in March 1996 with FY 96 funding of \$707,489)

- Funding of three NGOs to provide civic training in quartering areas as part of the demobilization activities of the Lusaka Protocol. (1996 with FY 95 funds of \$307,846)

TOTAL OTI FUNDING TO ANGOLA	
FY94	\$1.5 million
FY95	\$7.3 million, including \$3.9 in DOD transferred funds
FY96	\$8.5 million (projected)

Can We Make a Difference? Indicators such as increased Angolan capacity in mine awareness and demining, successful reintegration of ex-combatants, a freer exchange of news and information, and demonstrated participation of communities in revitalization projects show that well-timed inputs in areas critical for communities' return to peace can help.

OTI estimates that after only 2 months 18% of the listening audience in Angola uses the VOA program as a news source. The value of mine awareness is demonstrated by the reduction of mine accidents in Malange Province, from 10 accidents per week to one, with an estimated 470 lives saved in this province in one year.

Potential Partners. OTI's projects and funding will reach a peak in the late summer of 1996. USAID's coordinated strategy includes Food for Peace, OFDA, OTI and the Africa Bureau, which is opening a Mission to channel sustainable development resources as the transition to peace evolves.

The collaboration with DOD has proved critical in providing Angolans with the expertise and means to begin to demine their territory, an effort they will continue for many years. In addition, OTI has worked closely with multiple NGOs with extensive experience in Angola to expand their work into the critical area of land mines.

Despite tight central controls from both parties to the war, OTI is working at the municipal level, finding local groups that are eager to move beyond war.

Furthermore, the partnership with VOA is a bold new step in directing a proven and reliable news source at a transition situation where information has been heavily censored. This effort is complementary to a conflict resolution video production that the NGO, Search for Common Ground has done for OTI.

Risk and Return? The resurgence of war is still a threat and it will be some time before Angola's political system exhibits democratic ways. On the other hand, major progress has been made in the past year, and the significance of the Angolan opportunity argues for a well-informed and active involvement by OTI.

BOSNIA

Right Place? The war in the former Yugoslavia killed tens of thousands, produced ethnic cleansing of entire areas, showed Europe's inability to deal with a neighboring crisis and trapped our closest allies in a quagmire. Throughout the war, the United States has looked for ways to build a peace in Bosnia, without risking American lives.

Initial efforts suggested that reconstruction assistance would make a difference. That has not proven to be the case. Only an interventionist diplomacy, including bombing, blockades, embargoes and aggressive negotiation, combined with 60,000 NATO troops, finally created the necessary opening.

The critical question for the next year is: can the peace in Bosnia progress to the point that it is irreversible? If so, what can we do to enhance this opportunity?

Right Time? In the spring of 1996, IFOR completed its first major task: separating the region's warring armies. For the first time in years, average citizens were able to move about in their communities without fear of fighting.

The Dayton Peace Accords set out an ambitious calendar of events, including elections around September 1996. Tight central controls continue to inhibit freedoms of all kinds, but there are slow, steady improvements in the lives of many Balkan residents.

Key Features of Program. The central political development needs of Bosnia are *to reinforce the peace, to expand the political space, and to change the nature of the political dialogue*. OTI's program is designed to open up communications, expand networks, increase alliances, and challenge the status quo.

The work is being pursued with a combination of grass roots organizing and mass media initiatives. OTI has implemented programs throughout Bosnia since November 1994.

The first phase (until January 1996 with \$1 million of FY 95 funds) was designed to test conflict resolution and social development activities that would reduce levels of inter-ethnic tension and promote the Bosniac-Croat Federation. It was carried out by the International Rescue Committee and produced several key breakthroughs:

- * A model emergency shelter rehabilitation of uninhabitable homes for USAID's \$25 million, 2,500 unit, 1996 initiative. (\$2.5 million of OTI's FY 96 funds)
- * The development of independent media and programming in several markets.
- * The expansion of citizen's fora and cross-ethnic groups.

Phase two (January 1996 on) includes field offices in Tuzla and Zenica, and possibly Banja Luka. Planned initiatives include:

- * Mass media communications- a saturation citizen education campaign, focusing on "Making Peace Your Future", that will run on TV, radio, and in print. Produced locally, the spots are intended to prepare a skeptical populace for the elections and other responsibilities of the peace. (\$500,000+ FY 96)
- * Expanding civic organizations- organizing of civic groups such as student unions, nurses, teachers and other professionals, building of community alliances, and initiating of joint action activities through "political transition grants" . (\$4.5 million FY 96)

TOTAL OTI FUNDING TO BOSNIA	
FY94	\$0
FY95	\$1.0 million
FY96	\$8.0 million (projected)

Can We Make a Difference? Results from assessments, polls, and focus groups suggest that half the population in Bosnia expects more war and the other half thinks that peace will prevail. With a planned exit of U.S. troops near the end of the year, it is vital that more people in the region commit to a peaceful future.

Since so many analysts have credited the media, especially TV, with playing a major role in the political disintegration of the region, OTI is using it to advance a peaceful course.

Peace-seeking coalitions of citizens and grassroots organizations are beginning to address the fundamental attitudes and behaviors which have produced the latest Balkan war.

Potential Partners. The 50+ media outlets in the region are first line partners. OTI has also found numerous civic groups, although many have atrophied during the war. We expect to continue to build partnerships with multiple local groups.

Within the USG there is a high level of coordination. USIA surveys and broadcasts, State election initiatives, DOD civil affairs actions, are just a few of the areas of cooperation.

Risk and Return? The major risk has been the commitment of U.S. soldiers to the peace. OTI's complementary investment is assisting the people of the region to move beyond war and to reconstruct their lives with democratic ideals and free markets.

If the OTI initiatives appear to have a positive influence on the securing of the peace, we are prepared to increase our investment through the fall of 1997.

HAITI

Right Place? The United States' interest in Haiti was threefold: the democratic will and the freedoms of the people were being subverted, a long-term dependency on humanitarian assistance was developing, with chaotic immigration flows to the U.S.

In the fall of 1994 Haiti was a society which was suffering under a brutal three year de facto military regime. After decades of exploitation and repression, it had modest economic potential, with the United States feeding over 1,000,000 Haitians per day. Haiti's freely elected President was in exile in the U.S., and boatloads of his people were fleeing.

The OTI program has provided the appropriate civilian complement to a military intervention and helped to lay the foundation for the exit of U.S. forces in Haiti.

Right Time? Ten days after the first U.S. led multinational forces landed in Haiti, members of the OTI team arrived in Port au Prince. The return of President Aristide followed two weeks later and gave full voice to the overwhelming desire in Haiti for political development.

-----The opening came through the security provided by 20,000 multinational forces. It was complemented by the arrival of US Special Forces whose teams were deployed in the countryside. With security in place, Haitians were willing to try, once again, to resume some degree of normal daily life.

Key Features of the OTI Program. The central political development needs of Haiti were *to restore legitimate government at all levels, to move from a system of intimidation to one of broad public participation, and to support decentralized authority.* OTI has addressed these goals by working with local elected officials and community groups throughout Haiti, by designing an approach that required self-governance, and by providing an alternative course for the Haitian armed forces.

In the first two weeks in Haiti, OTI conducted an extensive rapid assessment covering all sectors of the country, and providing in-depth information about what potential existed to support the reestablishment of community life. Through the International Organization for Migration, a 52 member state organization, OTI was able to start its **communal governance program (CGP)** and its **demobilization-reintegration unit (DRU)**.

CGP - Beginning in November 1994, a network of 13 field teams was established throughout Haiti. These teams, consisting of international and Haitian workers, were charged with promoting constructive citizen involvement by bringing Haitians together at the local level. Field representatives encouraged Haitians to identify and set priorities for their common needs and concerns. The program had two phases:

Phase One: Working directly with communities to encourage participation.
(Nov. '94 - Sept. '95)

Phase Two: Fostering links between communities and local officials.
(Oct. '95 - Present)

Recently evaluated a success, the program initiated 2,019 projects in 113 of 134 communes, including 600 schools. By maximizing local ownership, open decision making, transparent financing, and community participation, the CGP has been able to leverage an initial USG investment of \$5 million dollars into a contribution valued at \$14 million dollars. At the same time, hundreds of Haitians have received on-the-job training in local governance, a stronger connection has been made between the needs of the countryside and the central government, and freedom of expression has been strengthened. (FYs 94, 95, 96 totalling \$13.6 million)

DKU - Operating since November of 1994; the demobilization and reintegration program contributes to the consolidation of the security environment in Haiti. With the much-hated Haitian military abolished, former soldiers and interim police have participated in an intensive six month vocational training effort. As of the end of March, 1996, 3,031 ex-soldiers had already finished their training; 1,818 were still in school. (FYs 94, 95, 96 totalling \$8 million)

The program was created with the following goals:

1. Helping the Government of Haiti develop a strategy to make the transition from military dominated to a civilian dominated society.
2. Provide former soldiers with basic technical skills necessary for reintegration, and participation in the formal sector.
3. Requiring former soldiers to participate in their reintegration.

Vocational training is taking place in Port au Prince and in five other locations. Private schools and government run institutions are being tapped to provide the training. Ten skills are being taught: electricity, plumbing, welding, tool and die making, auto repair, data entry, masonry, refrigeration, carpentry. Tool kits appropriate to the training are distributed to all participants who successfully complete their six month courses.

A post-training referral service has been established providing former soldiers with a clearinghouse on job opportunities, and job-hunting strategies. 112 post-training seminars have been attended by 2,494 participants to date.

A sample of 126 graduates found that nearly half, 61, were self-employed. Those with training in carpentry, plumbing, and masonry were the most likely to find jobs.

TOTAL OTI FUNDING TO HAITI	
FY94	\$6.9 million
FY95	\$10.4 million
FY96	\$4.3 million (projected)

Can We Make a Difference? What was essential in Haiti was a simple idea: hope. President Aristide's return moved people from hopelessness to hopefulness. The euphoria had to be supplemented with tangible results.

We also assumed that most post-conflict assistance would go to Port au Prince, and not to the rural areas, where 70 percent of the population lives. Therefore, our communal governance program targeted rural communes. We used our resources to demonstrate to Haitians that the restoration of legitimate democratically elected government could be translated into real projects if they were willing to become engaged: schools, water and sanitation facilities, construction of market places, environmental projects, and road repair.

OTI let the community decide its own priorities, and facilitated the implementation of projects through a decentralized grantmaking process, reducing paperwork and speeding the time between proposal making and decisions.

Potential Partners? Through a collegial inter-agency process OTI worked with DOD and State counterparts to produce a plan that supported US interests. The coordination of USG efforts was extraordinary.

We based our CGP program in Haiti on the belief that everyone was a potential partner. As long as the project benefitted a wide sector of the community we would be satisfied. The recent evaluation gave high marks to our inclusiveness of local groups and our ability to work with a wide range of actors in a highly charged political environment.

Risk and Return? OTI's investment in Haiti proved an appropriate response to the political situation. The investment in local governance supplied the important tangible evidence that things were returning to normal. International peacekeeping forces symbolized a secure environment. Rebuilding communities gave substance to ideas.

A US foreign policy priority, Haiti faces numerous challenges. The OTI effort to broaden the popular base for a democratic way of life is a substantial contribution to a more promising future.

RWANDA

Right Place? Rwanda focussed world attention on how the post-cold war period must deal with state failures, massive abuse of human rights, and ethnic strife. US interests centered on the need to bring justice and relief to the thousands of victims, while also providing the underpinnings for rebuilding society in the aftermath of a genocide.

The tragic events that unfolded in April 1994 in Rwanda resulted in the genocide of over half a million people. As Rwanda became a killing field led by Hutu government forces and prompted by hate radio, Tutsi rebels won control of the country, and millions of refugees fled into neighboring countries.

By July 1994 a humanitarian crisis of major proportions engaged the international community. The United States provided emergency food, water and shelter.

Right Time? With the war's end on July 20, 1994, only the shell of a country remained. Everything was needed, few resources were available, and assistance for governing was slow in coming. OTI began its work in Rwanda in the fall of 1994.

Key Features of Program. The central political development needs of Rwanda were *to deal with the genocide, to improve the sense of security in the countryside, and to expand the political marketplace.* OTI provided immediate support to Rwanda by: assisting with the recruitment and training of human rights monitors (HRFOR); providing initial assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal, and by developing a women in transition initiative.

HRFOR began its operation in Rwanda in the fall of 1994. Since HRFOR's inception, USAID/OTI has contributed \$1.2 million (FYs 95, 96) to the operation. Initially the funds assisted in getting the HRFOR functional, providing sorely needed logistical and staffing support.

OTI also supported the start-up of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Slow to get going and handicapped by the lack of an administrative home at the U.N., the Tribunal needed operational assistance. (\$1.5 million FY 96)

Having identified an excellent person and being able to move quickly, OTI also supplied the USAID Mission with a Justice Advisor, whose job it was to assist the new government in Rwanda with legal advice on the criminal trials that it would launch against the caseload of 70,000 defendants allegedly involved in the genocide. Alternative trial and sentencing systems, plus a method for creating a scientific sample profile of the prison population have been key contributions to the Rwandan problem. (\$139,000 FY 95)

The Women in Transition program, started in late September, 1995, forged a partnership between the Ministry of Family and Women and USAID. This initiative recognizes the potential role of women in Rwandan society, and provides them with the tools they need to expand their political, economic, and traditional role. Small grants for construction and credit form the core of this vital rehabilitation program, and also provide support for the political development of women leaders. (\$1 million FY 95)

TOTAL OTI FUNDING TO RWANDA	
FY94	\$0
FY95	\$2.4 million
FY96	\$2.0 million (projected)

Potential Partners? Rwanda's central development need following the horrible events of the spring and summer of 1994 was justice. OTI immediately began to support this area through projects with the UN, the Embassy and with the USAID mission.

OTI's justice advisor has been able to use the small funds invested in Rwanda as a catalyst for other donor support. Through her effort as convener, and because of the early money which arrived to support the Justice sector, other bi-lateral donors such as the German and Dutch governments, have also provided resources and technical advice at a critical moment in history.

The partnership with the Ministry of Family and Women could become a model for building new government's capacity, while providing much-needed fiscal controls and working with local groups.

Can we make a difference? OTI's investment in Rwanda has been small, but there are potential returns if Government of Rwanda officials pursue a nascent commitment to justice. Our work has focused on the issues that matter most to Rwandan officials and has emphasized within the international system that human rights and human dignity remain at the core of all efforts to rebuild this conflict-riddled society.

Risk and Return? Slow progress is being made in the justice area. If the Rwandan genocide can be dealt with in a way that establishes a new rule of law, then the risk will be rewarded. Providing additional political leverage for Rwanda's well-organized women, more than 60% of the post-holocaust population, could also produce a shift in the balance of power.

OTI PROGRAM COMPONENTS			
	INCREASING SECURITY	ENHANCING SURVIVAL	SELF GOVERNANCE
ANGOLA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Mine awareness training for 1,150,000 in over 10 provinces- in one area, injuries and fatalities have been reduced by 90% in first few months -Civic education training in quartering areas for demobilized fighters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Mine removal training for 660 Angolans -Small infrastructure projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -VOA daily Angolan news broadcasts reach 15% of listeners -Search for Common Ground conflict resolution video -Community rehabilitation projects with strong self-governance design, targeted to key post-conflict zones in UNITA areas
BOSNIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Possible cross-zonal telecommunications initiatives from Bosnia to Serbia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Model 17 unit emergency shelter project in Kiseljak -Gersony report on immediate summer of '96 US initiatives -Development of community centers with emphasis on refugees -April 1995 report on central Bosnian opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -TV/Radio mass media advertising campaign "Make Peace Your Future" will reach audience in all three ethnic areas -Capacity building of independent media, including broadcast reach -Support for independent civic groups and grassroots organizing -Visible community projects
HAITI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Demobilization and retraining of 5,000+ army, with 3,032 graduates from 23 vocational schools in 10 specialties -Joint community initiatives with US Special Forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Of 2,065 projects, 17% are sanitation, 9% are water supply, and many others meet baseline priority needs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -2,065 community improvement projects in 115 of 133 communes, with local contribution of \$9 million producing a total value of \$13.7 million (schools, health centers, basic infrastructure) -24 partnership agreements with new mayors -Multiple civic education fora and interactive meetings
RWANDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Human rights monitors in all parts of country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Multiple small scale credit, farming, and housing initiatives through local women's organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Genocide Conference in Kigali and resultant piece of legislation to address 70,000 prison detainees -Support for International Tribunal to deal with genocide -Capacity build of new ministry of women and families

OTHER COUNTRIES - LIBERIA

As an office that does not have a specific geographic or humanitarian mandate, OTI has been able to pass on opportunities that did not appear to be prudent. One example of a program that was developed with the thought that conditions might improve and then not pursued, was Liberia.

Right Place? Right Time? Last October hopes were high in Liberia. After five and a half years of a devastating civil war, a cease fire of the warring factions was holding under the Abuja Agreement, and plans were underway for deployment up country of the West African Peace Keeping Force, disarmament and demobilization of fighters, repatriation of refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons.

The task of recovery was monumental, with over 50% of the population of 2.5 million uprooted from their villages by one of the most violent conflicts against civilians in recent African history. An estimated 150,000 died at the hands of armed bands of poorly trained fighters, many of them children and adolescents, including the famed "small boys unit" of the faction that started the war.

A decade of strong rule and ethnic favoritism had ended violently in December 1989, and recurrent waves of factional violence, sometimes along ethnic lines, sometimes not, eventually created war-weariness even among the fighters and their leadership, with little left to loot in the countryside.

The United States interest in Liberia, from the historic links of the founding of the first black republic in the world by freed slaves, continued into this century, and throughout the Cold War. Liberia was a bulwark for the West in Sub-Saharan Africa, an allegiance that caused us to overlook repression, ethnic exclusion, and military rule in the eighties. Liberia's foreign debt reached \$2 billion pre-war, and since 1990 our humanitarian response has cost the United States \$447 million, principally in food relief.

Thus the breakthrough of the peace accords heralded a possible end to suffering and an alternative to the continuation of feeding over one million people in a country laced with rivers, underpopulated, and with the natural endowments to be self-sufficient.

The presence of immature political leaders, orphaned fighters, plenty of guns, few remaining institutions, marginal peacekeepers, and slight international interest argued for a cautious approach, with frequent reviews.

Key Features of the OTI Program. OTI participated in an assessment mission in October 1995 and then deployed a consultant for 14 weeks to Liberia to design a transition program in close coordination with the United Nations system, the European Union, and other USAID programs.

The result was a carefully articulated plan for the use of external assistance in a period of transition from war to peace. Humanitarian relief would continue temporarily, with an emphasis on assisting resettling populations to achieve substantial food security in a year's time by "jump-starting" agriculture and focusing on critical social infrastructure to make resettlement possible.

With a potential contribution of \$3 million, OTI would fund, together with the European Union and France, 12 Area Reintegration and Development Centers for the delivery of assistance and stimulation of Liberian initiative in a network of over 140 villages.

OTI stated in its program document that "as difficult as resettlement and material reconstruction may be, social reintegration of communities torn by the violent conflict is the essential challenge facing Liberians in the transition from war to peace. The mainstreaming of the estimated 60,000 fighters, most of whom are said to have fought in their own homelands, together with the commitment to peace of their leadership, are the decisive elements in maintaining the peace...Ironically, if some reconstruction and reinvestment were to occur in the absence of social rehabilitation of the ex-fighters, there would probably be a greater temptation to loot the newly reestablished material wealth."

Thus there would be a minimum level of material reconstruction which would begin in the transition year, but the focus would be on cultivating a lasting peace in the villages, with simultaneous community empowerment to prevent the recurrence of violence and resocialization and reintegration of ex-fighters in their communities.


Potential Partners. The Reintegration Program was to begin in mid April, funded jointly by European donors and the US, with the support of UN programs, particularly the World Food Program, UNHCR, UNDP, and UNICEF.

Recognizing that only Liberians can stop their war, the field staffing planned for the Area Centers was 19 Liberians for each international, the majority being village workers who would receive a modest stipend in recognition of their own contribution to putting their country's development on a peaceful track.


Can We Make a Difference? The resurgence of violence in Monrovia on April 6 confirmed OTI's caution. There is a longing for peace in Liberia yet there is little opportunity to express it. The manipulation of a terrorized population is matched with manipulation of millions of dollars of humanitarian assistance to support victims of a war that the leadership has little demonstrated intention of concluding.

Risk and Return. If we are to assist Liberia there must be a firm commitment by the warring factions to peace and the establishment of pluralistic democracy, demonstrated with disarmament and control of the fighters, and punitive measures to enforce the peace by a neutral force universally respected in Liberia. Only after this precondition is met can the task of building a new democratic Liberia begin.

1. The Hierarchy of Needs Continuum



2. U.S. Government Roles



LESSONS LEARNED

Transition situations are so charged with the unpredictable that it is vital to maintain a profile of constant learning. Staying open to that reality, adjusting as quickly as possible, and emphasizing the practical are trademarks of OTI.

As we apply the best practices from the field experiences of many organizations, OTI often thinks in terms of prototypes and new models as opposed to precedents. If it works we will do more of it, if not we try to stop as quickly as possible.

Among the lessons learned are the following:

- * Security first - until people feel a degree of safety, they are not ready for political development of any kind.
- * Timing is everything - fragile situations provide brief opportunities that may pass if not pursued immediately.
- * Speed is essential - a few resources early on are more valuable than greater activities at a later date.
- * Plans must be flexible and straightforward - in a dynamic situation static and complicated plans are not likely to work. These complex emergencies are difficult; combined with scarce resources and multiple players, they cry for simple approaches.
- * Have a clear goal - even if the means by which it is achieved evolves over time.
- * Politics is everywhere - these man-made situations are politically intricate and require a political perspective.
- * Be prepared to be opportunistic - Few formal structures exist anywhere, so the informal must often rule. Do not look for familiar organizations or traditional relationships (bilateral agreements with a host government, for example), instead think of anyone as a potential partner.
- * Keep the people as your customer - in analyzing the merit of an idea, see if it has a salutary impact on the citizenry versus the usual suspects.
- * Keep your resources liquid - adjustments are always needed.

- * Look for catalytic investments - minimal resources can generate high impact activities. Initial problem solving leveraged with a local match can create a heightened sense of progress.
- * "If you build it they will come" - tangible projects often provide the means by which political life can be rebuilt. Physical space is often a precondition for political space.
- * Align your projects with real local demand - use participation and local contributions as signs of ownership.
- * Be impartial - keep the system for deciding what to do, and where to do it totally transparent.
- * Follow-through - these are delicate times. Keep the promises, or the trust that is needed to proceed will never take hold.
- * Recruit people with field experience and political sensitivity -people must be agile and adaptable in order to adjust and to analyze.
- * Maintain a sense of urgency, but promise some continuity - even though it is important to keep moving, contracting for services of up to one year will help to attract better local hires and will provide cost-savings on leases and other contracts.
- * Make sure your expectations are realistic - with so much to do it is easy to overcommit. Focus on the doable, build off successes, and create some constructive momentum.
- * Be prepared to create new ways of doing business - our traditional bureaucratic or turf-sensitive approaches may need to be altered. Challenge the system.
- * Build partnerships within the US Government and without - there is too much to do and not enough to do it with. That is true for most players in these circumstances. Strategic alliances work.
- * Do no harm - avoid practices or choices that will need to be reversed soon. Avoid overbuilding government agencies or overdeveloping international presence, if there is no potential revenue stream to support it.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Based on the OTI experience in Rwanda, in 1995 we commissioned a report on the operation of human rights monitoring programs in several countries. The report, Strengthening Human Rights Monitoring Missions, described the various obstacles to responding rapidly to human rights emergencies. It reviewed the current capacity of the United Nations system, both the peacekeeping operation and the newly established office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.

As a result of this review of human rights monitoring the report recommended that US government agencies, the United Nations and the non-governmental human rights organizations establish mechanisms which would provide quick responses to crises through the establishment of centralized rosters of field personnel, training programs which address post-conflict needs, and methodologies which would allow the rapid deployment of specialists to the field. (\$72,000 FY 95)

OTI plans to pursue the operational demands of human rights emergencies. The office will work with others in the donor community and in the non-governmental world to ensure that this vital area of post-crisis response functions efficiently and effectively, in a form which addresses basic human rights needs.

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